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ABSTRAC'r 
This paper examines the likely effects of the aging of the 
baby boom on labor force attachment, unemployment, and wages. 
Labor market trends between now and 2020 are the focus of 
analysis, when the majority of the baby boom generation will 
confront its retirement decision. 
We begin by reviewing past labor force trends and discussing 
important limitations of existing projection methods.  Key 
elements needed to project the consequences of the demographic 
shock facing the labor market are identified.  The task of 
developing a fully specified economic model to examine the effect 
of the aging of the baby boom on the labor market is as yet 
incomplete.  On the basis of the best available evidence, we 
suggest the following conclusions can be drawn: 
•The trend towards earlier retirement will slow and perhaps 
reverse in the next few decades. 
•tJnemployment  should fall among older workers and the 
aggregate full-employment unemployment rate should also 
decline as the baby boom ages. 
•The aging of the baby boom will not depress wages 
substantially, either for older workers or for other 
demographic groups. 
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Introduction 
While many havc  written about possible effects of  the baby boom on the U.S. economy, 
few have recognized chat this demographic  transition provides analysts with a unique and valuable 
opportunity  to investigate how the labor  market  works.  Specifically,  as baby boomers move up 
the age distribution,  they inipart a one-time  shock to the supply  of  potential  workers in each age 
brackct.  Because this  change is exogenous, many of the tools  labor  economists typically apply can 
be utilized  to predict  how the aging of the baby boom will  alter  key  labor  market  outcomes. 
Theoretical  and empirical  models which  (either  implicitly or explicitly) hold constant structural 
parameters in order  to work through the effects of  an exogenous shock are well-suited  to address 
this issue. 
The goal of  this  paper is to use economic tools to analyze the impact of  the baby boom  on 
three key labor  market outcomes: labor force  participation  rates, unemployment, and wages.  We 
concentrate mainly on this  particular  cohorts labor  market outcomes, but also consider  the 
implications of  this group for  the labor  market  as a whole. Since most of  the prime-age  population 
participates in  the labor  market, we focus analysis on labor market trends between the period 
between the present and 2020, when the majority  of  the baby boom generation will confront  the 
retirement  decision.  Consequently, an important topic of  discussion will be retirement  patterns of 
older workers and a consideration of  whether  the trend towards earlier  retirement will continue in 
the next three decades. In addition,  we briefly examine the effects of the aging baby boom  on 
unemployment,  and on wages for  older workers  as well as for  workers of  other  ages. 
Our review  of  the evidence leads us to conclude that trends towards earlier  retirement will 
slow and perhaps reverse. New Social Security  rules have already been  enacted to encourage later 2 
retirement.  Pension incentives towards early retirement will be curtailed as fewer workers will be 
available to replace retiring baby boomers. A great deal of  evidence indicates that  fmancial 
incentives have a strong impact on workers' retirement decisions, so these changes in pensions and 
Social Security should slow the trend toward earlier retirement.  Our prediction is further supported 
by data on projected changes in workforce composition.  Since growth will probably not  be 
concentrated in the blue-collar sector where workers  productivity is more likely to decline with 
age, early retirement may be avoided by more workers in the future. 
We also conclude that the aging labor market will bring with it a reduction in 
unemployment, and will have little impact on relative wages.  Both unemployment among older 
workers and the aggregate full-employment unemployment rate  should fall as the baby boom ages. 
While job  displacement of  older  workers currently leads to substantial hardship, this problem 
should be somewhat reduced in the future.  In future economic expansions, businesses will not be 
able to rely on a young "reserve army of  the unemployed" to fill new positions as in the past; 
displaced older workers may more often become the new recruits. Steady state aggregate 
unemployment should also fall as the labor forte becomes more heavily weighted with older 
workers with traditionally  lower unemployment rates. The effect of  baby boom aging on wages is 
more difficult to track because employers have the potential to substitute  capital for  labor, and to 
hire workers from other demographic groups.  However, controlling for  all such interactions, there 
is no support for the conclusion that wages will be substantially depressed either for  older 
workers, or for  other demographic groups. 
The argument is developed in three parts.  A first section reviews recent  labor forte trends 
and discusses published predictions regarding retirement patterns as the baby boom  ages over the 
next three decades. The second section identifies determinants of  retirement suggested by the labor 
economics literature of  the past  decade and offers informed judgemenc about  possible future 
participation patterns. The third part of  the paper  briefly examines the effects of  an aging baby 
boom on unemployment and wages.  A brief summary concludes the discussion. Labor  Force Trends.  Past and Future 
Before examining projecuons regarding the future labor force, ii is useful to briefly review 
labor force developments to date as well as the explanations for  these patterns. Here we sketch past 
trends in labor force participation, and then go on to discuss previous efforts to project labor forte 
figures into the future. 
Looking Backward: Labor Market Trends to 1990 
Labor force participation tt-ends for  older workers and over have been the Subject  of  intense 
discussion and debate in recent years.  There  is general agreement over several key facts: 
•Labor  force participation rates for  older men ha-ye dropped by half  since 1900. 
Among men age 60 and older, 66 percent were in the labor forte in 1900, according to archival 
evidence, while less  than half that many, 26 percent, were active by 1990 (Table 1). 
•The trend to earlier retirement  among  men  has not been a  steady one. In fact, men's participation 
rates were quite stable between  1900 and the mid-  '30's, then began falling in 1937, continued 
falling steadily for  fifty years through the late  1980's. (Figure 1). It is possible that  the trend to 
early retirement may actually have reversed over the last two years, inasmuch as participation rates 
have risen in the 60-64 age range for two  years in a row -- a phenomenon almost without precedent 
in the last quarter century in the United States.  (Detailed age  breakdowns by age appear in Figure 
2 for  men age 60-61 and 62-64 since 1960). 
•Labor force  trends for  women have been more mixed over  the century. Since 19(X), older 
women's labor  force  attachment figures rose, but  their  rates over  the century fell  relative to 
younger women. Around 1900,  older women's  (age  55-64)  participation  rates  stood  at 21 percent 
for nonmarried women, and 2 percent for wives.  By 1980, participation rates for older 
nonmarried women rose to 54 percent, and 37 percent for  older wives. (Goldin 1990).  Older 4 
women's participation rates are still about twenty percentage points below those of  younger 
women (USDOL 1991). 
•For older women the trend to earlier  retirement may have rersed  slightly in the last  five years. 
As Figure 2 indicates, labor force participation rates of  women in their early 60's have risen 
slightly since about 1986. Nevertheless, older women's participation rates remained at only two 
thirds those of similar aged male rates by 1990. 
Overall, the evidence demonstrates a clear and increasing tendency not to work at  older 
ages among men, and a relative decline in participation among older women over time. 
Labor market status of older people has also been examined using other  variables as well. 
Some analysts examine whether or  not an individual was employed during a short period of  time 
(e.g. work during a single survey week) while others tabulate peoples affirmative answers to 
questions like  are you  now retired?" as an indication of  retirement status (Fields and Mitchell 
[1984] and Quinn et  al [1990] review various definitions of  retirement status).  Most of these data 
are not  avaiiable over time, so cannot reveal much about  trends in labor force attachment. 
There is somewhat more research on what has been called "partial" or  "phased" retirement, 
generally viewed as employment subsequent to one's career job with either fewer hours of  work 
per  week, or at a lower wage rate, or  both.  An investigation by Gustman and Steinmeier (1984) 
showed that  almost a quarter of  the 64-year old  and 38 percent of  the 69-year old men examined 
considered themselves partially retired by this measure during the 1970's. Subsequent analysis of 
the same data set by Quinn et  al. (1990) confirms that most of these individuals spend only a short 
time in this partial retirement Status, moving out of the labor force thereafter rather rapidly. 
Whether partial or phased retirement is gaining ground among the older workforce of  the 1990's 
cannot be determined yet,  since there is no current longitudinal survey of this group.  It is 
anticipated that data necessary to examine these trends in the near future will be provided by the new Health and Retirement Survey, under development by the University of  Michigan's Institute 
for Survey Research and funded by the National Institute on Aging. 
Last but  not least,  there  is ample evidence that part time work has become more important 
in older peoples  work patterns.  As Quinn et al (1990) demonstrate, there  is a  large jump in the 
prevalence of  part time work at age 65, from 6 to 48 percent for men, and from 20 to almost 60 
percent for  women. This pattern complements other indicators of the trend toward early retirement 
in the U.S. labor market: fewer people are remaining employed at older ages, and when they do 
they are increasingly likely to work part-time rather  than full time. 
Lookjne Forward: Published Labor Force Projections for  the 21 Century 
Will this powerful trend to earlier retirement in the US labor market continue?  Over  the 
past  few decades, labor force projections by the U.S. government, combining predicted population 
trends and LFPRs, have become quite  common.  This section will consider where these 
projections come from and what can  be learned from them. 
There are at least  three major sources of  labor force projections produced by research and 
policy organizations and widely discussed in public policy circles. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) regularly presents projections with a  relatively short horizon, typically no longer than 15 
years into the future.  Two other  government agencies have provided labor force projections 
further into the future. The Bureau of  Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes a report every five 
years with projections that  extend 50 years. In addition, the Social Security Administration (SSA) 
has projected the size of the labor force to the year 2060. This agencys report was not part of  a 
continuing research program, however.  It was conducted in the early 1980's to determine whether 
existing financing methods could  generate enough revenue to provide benefits to the anticipated 
larger cohorts of  retired workers. 
As noted above, the projected size of the labor force is the product of  two  elements, the 
anticipated size of  the population and labor force participation rates.  Since Preston's paper at this 6 
conference extensively analyzes population projections, we focus here on predicted labor  force 
participation rates. 
The methodology that is employed in each these projections is quite similar (c.f. Flaim and  - 
Fullerton  1978 for a detailed description of  the BLS projection method). Typically, past trends are 
extrapolated to predict future behavior. Ad hoc manipulations are then made to eliminate 
impossible results (e.g. labor force participation rates greater than 100 percent or  less than 0 
percent) or results which are "highly implausible'  (e.g. women's labor force participation rates 
higher than men's).  Minor adjustments are also made for  other factors, such as the level of 
economic growth (all projections presented here assume moderate growth).  Some of  the 
projections are interrelated as well;  the BEA's longer term projections start with the predicted rates 
of  the BLS and then extrapolate this series. 
Table 2 presents alternative projections of the civilian labor  force participation rate for 
selected years and different demographic groups, in addition to a snapshot of  current participation 
rate  patterns. The evident similarity in predicted participation rates for a given demographic group 
(especially for men) is indicative of  the similarity in techniques employed.  For  instance, the 
participation rate predicted by the BEA for  all men in 2015 is identical to the one predicted by SSA 
for  2020: both agencies indicate that market attachment among men will fall from the current level 
of  76.1 percent to 72 percent over the next 25 to 30 years.  This prediction is largely a result of  the 
population being more heavily weighted towards older workers who have lower labor market 
attachment. 
There are some  differences in projected rates for  individual age groups among men, 
however. Both the BLS and BEA project a continuing small decline in LFPR's among older men 
(over age  65), while the SSA does not.  On the other hand, the SSA's projected growth in teenage 
labor force participation is considerably greater than in the BEA and BLS. 
Projections  for  women are more variable, as one might expect given dramatic changes in 
female labor force participation of  the recent past. As was the case for the men,  market attachment 
among women as a  whole is predicted to decrease after the year 2000 because of  the changing age composition of  the workforce. Estimates of  labor force behavior among individual age  groups 
show  marked discrepancies across projections, however.  The BLS and BEA project a continued 
large increase in participation among prime-age women while the SSA predicts virtually no change. 
Also, SSA projections for older  women show virtually no change from current rates, while the 
BLS and BEA show a slight trend towards earlier retirement. 
Historically, labor market projections seldom resemble observed behavior.  As we will 
demonstrate, relatively short-term projections by the BUS have not been very reliable for  many 
demographic groups where labor supply patterns have undergone change in the last decades.  This 
calls into even greater question the BEA and SSA projections extending beyond the next 15 years, 
well into the 21st century. 
Table 3 collects three  BUS projections for  age/sex groups made at three different points in 
time, along with the observed participation rates in that year for  that group. One striking 
observation is that in some  instances, the difference between projected and observed rates is over 
50 percent.  Groups where projections are fraught with the largest errors, as one might  expect, are 
women and older  workers.  For  example, the 1985 rate for women aged 25-34 projected as 
of 1970 was 46.7 percent, but the observed 1985 rate  was 70.9 percent. The projections are not 
always underestimates; thus, for  instance, 35.9 percent of  men aged 65-69 were projected to 
participate in the labor force in 1985, but only 24.4  percent actually did. 
Another observation about these projections is that the pattern of discrepancy has changed 
over time.  Comparing actual data with projections for 1980 and 1985,  two patterns were clear: 
more women were entering the labor market and more men were retiring at younger ages than 
anticipated.  However, in 1990 these patterns appear to have reversed to some extent.  Projected 
participation for  younger women, between the  ages of 16 and 24, was actually higher  than 
observed.  Similarly, more  older workers (Over age 55, both men and women) remained in the 
labor market than projections indicated. 
This finding highlights an inherent flaw in projection technology which essentially relies on 
a linear extrapolation with only minor modifications. When behavioral patterns change, projections using the existing methodology will be "too slow' to respond. To illustrate this 
problem, consider observed and projected participation rates for women aged 20-24,  one of  the 
demographic groups undergoing volatile change in their labor market behavior during the last 
twenty years.  (Note that while  the focus of  this section is clearly on labor force behavior of older 
workers, this younger group was chosen for analysis here because it presents the best example of 
the patterns we seek to explain).  Figure 3 presents observed participation rates for  this group from 
1946 through 1990, along with four projections we have made through a simple linear 
extrapolation technique. To correspond  as closely as possible to Table 3, we project  future labor 
force participation rates for 1980, 1985, and 1990 using data available in 1965, 1970, and 1978, 
respectively. In addition, participation in the year  2000 is also projected. The 20 years of 
observed participation rates immediately preceding the projection date are used to estimate the linear 
trend. Observed participation rates in the projection year  are then incremented by the trend to 
predict future values. 
As reported in Table 4, rates predicted for 1980, 1985 and 1990 using linear  extrapolation 
are remarkably similar to those projected by the BLS for  this demographic group. This  suggests 
that the BL.S's judgmental adjustments to extrapolated rates were relatively minimal.  Nevertheless, 
there is a huge difference between the observed and projected rates.  Projected figures understate 
the observed in 1980 and 1985, and overstate them in 1990. This example provides a clear 
indication of  the problems inherent in existing projection methodology. When the raur of  change in 
LFPRs  is increasing, linear extrapolation leads to underpredicted values without  adjusting 
extrapolated rates. Similarly, decreasing rates of  change lead to overpredicted participation rates. 
Both of  these effects are observed in Figure 3.  The fact that extrapolated rates to the year 2000 are 
significantly different than the BLS projections (as shown in Table 4) indicates that in more  recent 
projections, larger adjustments must have been made. 
Figures 4 and 5 and the remainder of  Table 4 report the results of  similar analyses for  older 
male and female workers (age 55-64). For older men, the increasing rate of  early withdrawal from 
the labor force led to overpredictions of the participation rate until the trend towards early retirement slowed in the mid 1980s.  This last  effect produced an underestimate of  men's 
participation for 1990. Note that the similarity in the linear extrapolations and the BLS projections 
indicates that through 1990, few ad hoc adjustments were made to reported rates.  However, the 
fact that the BLS projections for  the year 2000  are considerably higher than those  obtained from 
linear extrapolation indicates that a large  ad hoc adjustment must have been made. 
For older  women, the increasing participation rates prior to 1965  led to substantially 
overprojected rates for 1980 and 1985. In contrast, the relatively constant rates from 1965-85 led 
to projected rates being too low in 1990, after  rates began to rise again. The BLS projections for 
this demographic group, however, have been consistently lower than those obtained by linear 
extrapolation, indicating ad  hoc reductions in projected rates occurred regularly through 1990. For 
the year  2000, the BLS has now adjusted projections, raising the rate obtained by linear 
extrapolation. 
This section has extensively investigated the limitations of projection methods currently 
used for 'short-term'  labor force projections.  The problems in this exercise should cast serious 
doubt on even longer term projections carried out by a variety of agencies and analysts. Our goal 
has not been to indict current methodology, since under many circumstances it may be  the best 
technique available. Changes in the underlying structural parameters of  the labor market are 
difficult to predict in many cases, implying that a  mainly statistical  procedure which masks the 
effects of  these economic factors may be the simplest approach.  On the other  hand, we believe 
there are economic factors which should also inform a model used to project future labor force 
outcomes. It is to the development of  this model we turn next. 
Economic Mode!s of Retirement  Trends 
To understand how the baby boom will affect labor markets, an economic model of 
behavior should be constructed.  As argued at the outset, models of  this sort  would be particularly 
useful in this Context  because they hold constant structural parameters in onler to work through the 
effects of  an exogenous shock such as the one imparted on the labor market by the baby boom. 10 
Nevertheless, the task of  developing a fully specified economic model to examine the effect of  the 
aging of  the baby boom on the labor market is at present not  possible.  Indeed it pmbably will 
require many more years of research. Instead of  presenting a clearly inadequate formal model, we 
instead undertake the job here of describing the building blocks that a fully specified model will 
certainly need to incorporate. This section employs these building blocks to the question of how 
retirement trends might be expected to change as we move  toward 2020. 
The Economic Determinants of  Early Retirement 
Ten years ago, many researchers in the retirement field believed that  most older workers 
remained employed as long as possible, and retired only when forced to by poor  health, mandatory 
retirement, or other 'push" factors. However,  this view has been deeply undermined by the last 
decade of  retirement research. 
The Role of Poor Health: 
It is certainly the case that health problems force some older workers to leave their jobs. 
When this occurs, it must  be agreed that  retirement is not a choice but  rather a necessity compelled 
by poor health. The important issue, however, is how numerous are such people and whether the 
incidence of  disabling health problems is increasing among the population experiencing earlier 
retirement -- that is, workers  in their late 50's and early  60's. 
After  reviewing the evidence, we  believe that (I) there is little support for the view that 
health is a major factor explaining early retirement, and (2) increasingly poor health cannot explain 
the long-term trend toward earlier retirement in the United States.  We focus first on the importance 
of  health as a determinant of early retirement. Here the evidence shows that relatively few  give 
health-related reasons for  retirement. For example, only 12 percent of  more than one thousand 
men surveyed by the Social Security Administration gave poor health as the primary reason for 
leaving their main job (Fields and Mitchell 1984). In addition, many researchers note that these 
statistics will overstate the role of poor  health because retirees own assessment of their health 11 
status is colored by illness/disability being a socially acceptable rationale for  retirement, and 
because reporting oneself to be in poor  health is a prerequisite for  various government transfer 
payments.  An excellent review of  recent  studies can be found in Sammartino (1987).  When 
researchers examine more  objective  health measures from clinical sources, evidence on 
impairments, and mortality outcomes, they generally conclude that health has some  role to play, 
but by no means is it as important as economic variables  in explaining labor  market withdrawal 
(Fields and Mitchell 1984, Quinn et al. 1990). Thus most workers retire  for  reasons other than 
poor health. 
The weight of  the evidence is also  not supportive of the claim that the long-term trends 
toward early  retirement was driven primarily by worsening health among workers in their late 50's 
and early 60's. The evidence is somewhat mixed, because problems arising in self-reported health 
measures become exacerbated over time.  Thus, for instance, Bailey (1987) notes large increases 
over time in the number of  self-reported days of  limited activity due to illness or disability among 
those age 45-64, as well as among the elderly.  However the survey questionnaire was changed in 
the late 1960's, resulting in the same number of  people reporting health limitations, but a large 
increase in the extent to which health limitations were deemed restrictive. Thus the time trend 
Bailey reports in health limits is less than fully persuasive. Similarly, disability cases seem to be 
increasing in the older population overtime, but changes in eligibility  rules for  Social Security 
Disability benefits may explain a large pars of this trend. On the one hand, it seems clear that a 
much older population will have more health problems than will a younger group (Poterba and 
Summers 1987). On the other hand, there is no strong evidence that the health status of  those  age 
55 to 65 deteriorated sufficiently to explain the strong decline in work among this age group from 
World War II onward. 
Mandatory Retirement: 
Prior  to 1978, many employers imposed mandatory retirement at age  65. This policy was 
altered in 1978 with the Federal Age Discrimination  in Employment Act, which moved the 12 
mandatory retirement age to 70; subsequently the age bar  was lifted altogether for most private 
sector employees. 
Even before mandatory retirement was outlawed, however, most firms  did not force older 
workers out using this policy (Fields and Mitchell 1984).  Less than half  of all private sector 
workers during the early 1970's were in jobs covered by mandatory retirement provisions, and 
fewer than 5 percent of  retirees appear to have worked long enough to have been forced out by 
mandatory retirement. Thus it seems safe to conclude that mandatory retirement was not an 
increasingly powerful force driving workers to early retirement over the last several decades. 
Having established that  most older workers are not forced to retire, it  is necessary to then 
elaborate other explanations for early  retirement. Research on workers  reaching retirement age  has 
demonstrated that preeminent among these other explanations are economic factors, including most 
importantly wages and retirement wealth. Along these lines, an analysis of older  men's retirement 
patterns by Fields and Mitcheli (1984) concluded that economic factors such as wages and 
retirement benefits accounted for  three-quarters of  the explained variance irs retirement ages across 
people, while poor  health was found to account for  only one-quarter. 
Wealth: 
One factor which certainly played a role in inducing earlier retirement over time was an 
increase in overall wealth.  U.S. economic growth since World War II contributed importantly to 
real wage growth over time, despite periods of  inflation and economic slowdown. During most of 
their productive lifetimes, workers earned more and accumulated more assets than their parents' 
cohorts. As a consequence, succeeding generations of  older  persons attained retirement age in 
better economic conditions than at most any time in the past (Burkhauser and Quinn 1989).  Since 
leisure is a normal good, in economic terms, this increase in older people's wealth permitted 
additional consumption of  retirement years over the decades (Fields and Mitchell 1984). 13 
Long-term  asset growth was accompanied by two other developments which also 
permitted, if not encouraged, earlier retirement: the growth of  the U.S. Social Security system, 
and the maturation of the private pension system. 
Social Security: 
Several different institutional features of  the Social Security system contributed to make 
early  retirement increasingly attractive and feasible  over time in the US. First, coverage grew 
rapidly over the post-WWII period: only about 60 percent of  the labor force was covered during 
the 1950's, whereas over 90 percent of  all workers are covered now (Aaron, 1982). Almost all 
retirees today receive some income from Social Security, compared to only about one-third of  all 
private sector workers receiving a pension (Piascentini  and Cerino 1990). 
A second institutional change implemented  in Social Security  over time had to do with the 
age at which a worker could  first  become eligible for  Social Security retirement benefits.  This age, 
initially set at  65, was dropped for women to age  62 in 1956, and for  men in 1961 (Rejda 1982). 
The fact  that retirement payments are payable at  62 has enabled many to afford early retirement that 
they might not have been able to afford otherwise. 
Another way in which Social Security changed making retirement more am-active  over time 
had to do with benefit  growth.  After taking into account inflation, the average Social Security 
benefit payable to a newly retired male rose 50 percent in real terms between 1955 and 1985 
(Ippolito, 1990). Pre- and post-retirement increases of  massive proportions were legislated by a 
Congress eager to more than protect benefits against inflation, a policy which made retirement 
more affordable, and thus increasingly prevalent,  among older Americans over time. 
Two additional features of  Social Security have been cited as contributing to earlier 
retirement.  One is that at various points over the years, benefits under the system were structured 
to subsidize early  retirement (Fields and Mitchell 1984). This occurred when the present value of 
future Social Security benefits payable to a worker who  retired early (age 62) were just as high as 
(or higher than) the present value of  benefits payable to someone deferring early retirement. This 14 
situation axose somewhat inadvertently, because the rules specified that someone who  worked to 
age  65 paid more tax than if  he retired early, yet age-65 benefits were not  enough larger to offset 
this additional tax payment.  In addition, the early retiree would enjoy leisure, further weighting the 
balance in favor of leaving early. 
A different way in which Social Security discouraged  continued work after  eligibility for 
benefits is via the so called "earnings test". This regulation permits the older benefit recipient to 
work and earn up to a threshold level, after which point Social Security payments begin to be 
reduced to offset additional earnings. This Social Security  "earnings test" is certainly a labor 
market deterrent to some  older workers, but  several studies have also  demonstrated that it is not 
relevant to many others (Leonesio 1990). Part of  the reason that the earnings test may not deter 
work at older ages is that for some people, additional earnings beyond age 60 can  have a 
pronounced positive effect on the Social Security  Primaiy insurance Amount (this is particularly 
important when high nominal earnings after age 60 replace low or  zero wages earlier  in life). While 
there is still some controversy about  the political wisdom of  retaining the earnings test, the 
evidence suggests that removing it would not  induce much more work among the older  population 
though it would cost the system a great  deal (Gustman and Steinmeier 1991). 
While Social Security benefits certainly grew more generous for  those retiring since World 
War II, these benefit increases must be weighed against  increases in taxes which accompanied the 
growth of the system. Taking into account this factor also suggests a damping effect: beneficiaries 
retiring in 1950 earned an implicit (risk-free) return on their contributions of  about 20 percent per 
year in real terms, far exceeding that which they could have earned in the private market.  The rate 
of  return on contributions was about 12 percent for  workers retiring only 15 years later (Moffitt 
1977),  and will probably be even smaller, if  not negative, in the future.  What this implies is that 
cohorts retiring forty years ago received relatively greater wealth transfers from the system than do 
today's older workers, providing those early groups with stronger early  retirement incentives than 
were afforded to later ones. Hence the so-called "start-up" phase of  Social Security provided the 
first several retiring cohorts more wealth than later cohorts got, suggesting a diminution of 15 
retirement incentives in recent years. Whether and how retirement trends will respond to future 
Social Security changes is taken up again in a subsequent section. 
Pensions: 
A variety of  labor market institutions have made early retirement  more attractive in the last 
several decades, particularly the growth and development of employer-sponsored pensions.  The 
growth of  the private pension system has been striking: immediately following World  War II, only 
19 percent of  private sector wage and salary workers were covered by pension plans, whereas by 
1987 the fraction covered was 46 percent (Turner and Beiler 1990) This rapid growth in pension 
coverage has moderated and perhaps even turned around over the last five to seven years, 
however, evidently because of  changing labor force composition, a shift to smaller firms and a 
trend away from unionized manufacturing jobs (e.g. Clark  and McDermed 1990). 
There is ample evidence that employers and their workers enable and often encourage 
earlier  retirement over time, often by means  of  their pension plan. Recent research has shown that 
defined benefit plans frequently offer attractive incentives to retire before age 65, and many do not 
impose an actuarial reduction in benefits among those leaving early (Mitchell, forthcoming ia]). 
Retirement supplements and bonuses, early retirement window plans, and a variety of  other 
mechanisms have the effect of  offering benefits which are largest if  the worker retires as  soon  as he 
or she is eligible (Mutchler 1986, Lumsdaine et al 1990). In other words, the present value of  the 
worker's retirement annuity stream from a defined benefit plan will often be maximized if  early 
retirement is accepted, but  will gall the longer retirement is delayed (Mitchell and Fields, 1985). 
Not only do such pensions offer  retirement wealth which enables workers to retire earlier, but also 
they structure benefits in such a way that workers can leave early without suffering large benefit 
cuts.  These patterns  have a potent effect on workers retirement decisions, a finding supported by 
dozens of  econometric studies conducted during the  1980's and carefully reviewed by Quinn ci al 
(1990). 16 
The  effect of  defined benefit pensions on retirement is indisputable, but in order to account 
for trends in early retirement it must also be demonstrated that corporate pension policy changed 
over time in such a way as to increase the appeal of leaving early.  Evidence on this point, while 
difficult to obtain, is beginning to emerge in studies of specific companies tracked over time 
(Luzadis and Mitchell forthcoming; Ippolito 1990). Available evidence offers evidence that at least 
some defined benefit plans changed their retirement incentives between 1960 and 1980 in such a 
way as to increase the financial attractiveness of early retirement. This was accomplished by 
increasing benefit payments and tilting pension benefit formulas to lower the age at  which pension 
benefit streams were maximized. Though explanations for  these patterns are still  only suggestive, 
it is likely that these early retirement incentives grew more pronounced over time in less  profitable 
firms, and for workers with longer time on the job. It must be concluded that if  pension plans 
could be structured to make early retirement more appealing, it will be possible to reverse this trend 
should labor shortages develop requiring extending the worklife. 
Wages. 
Wage patterns by eduction have diverged substantially over the last two  decades, and this 
subject has been the subject of  intense study.  In the main, this literature tends to conclude that 
wages are becoming increasingly unequal over time, with earnings becoming particularly stagnant 
among the least educated segment of  the workforce (cf. Levy 1987). However few analysts have 
narrowed the analysis to the older segment of  the workforce and there is little evidence on whether 
these wage trends are exacerbated among the older age  group.  Hence it is not  currently known 
whether falling wages may have contributed to earlier retirement trends experienced in the past 
decade. 17 
Modeling  the Effects  of Future  Demographic  Change  on Early Retirement 
Having  identified  above  the most  important  regulatory  and  economic  factors  affecting 
retirement  outcomes,  it remains to discuss how these factors might be anticipated to affect 
retirement patterns as the labor force ages. 
Focusing first on the regulatory environment, we  suspect that changing incentives will lead 
to a reduction or  reversal in the trend towards early retirement. Many government policies have 
recently been implemented to encourage continued work both now and in the future. This includes 
legislation raising and then eliminating the practice of  mandatory retirement for  most sectors of  the 
labor market, as well as  age  discrimination legislation and disability  regulations providing 
opportunities for  older workers to remain employed in the future should they so wish. 
Social Security rules were also altered with reforms legislated in 1983, policies which will 
be affecting retirement incentives for  cohorts of  retirees well into the 21st century.  In summary 
form, it is fair to characterize these reforms as raising the normal retirement age under Social 
Security from age  65 to 67 for baby  boomers, and reducing benefits for those retiring prior  to age 
65.  Additionally these reforms subjected a portion of  retirees' Social Security benefits to income 
tax, which in turn reduces the net payoff to retirement and increases the relative attractiveness of 
remaining employed. Unfortunately, the specific Social Security reforms undertaken will probably 
have only a tiny effect on retirement patterns over the next thirty five years, according to numerous 
evaluation studies using a variety of  economic models. Instead, what will probably occur  at least in 
the near term is that workers will continue to retire at roughly the same age, but will be more at risk 
for  old-age poverty because benefits are lower (Mitchell, forthcoming [bj). 
Other pressures on federal budgets may also affect retirement patterns. For  example the 
nations health insurance program for  people age 65 and over, Medicare, is scheduled to run out of 
money several years before the baby boom reaches retirement age (Aaron et al 1989). These 
pressures will certainly strengthen the governments intentions to reverse the early retirement trend, 
though gradual changes in entitlement programs may not be effective in achieving this end. 18 
The other factor  affecting retirement trends, as argued above, is employer-provided 
pensions.  Here too several changes may be anticipated (Andrews and Mitchell 1986). Pensions 
may become less  widespread andjor less generous in the future if, for  example, marginal tax rates 
fall thereby reducing the appeal of  pensions as a savings device.  If Congress limits or ends the 
tax-preferred status of  pensions in the future, this would seriously decrease pension plans' appeal 
as a retirement savings devise and diminish the prevalence of  corporate pensions.  It also is 
possible that the baby boom generation may receive lower total compensation because of  its sheer 
size (more on this below), implying that pensions may become less prevalent. Other factors also 
likely to reduce pension coverage are declining firm size and changing industrial mix. Economies 
of scale make retirement investment more efficient in larger firms, but  as the service sector replaces 
the shrinking manufacturing sector, where smaller firms are more prevalent, demand for  pensions 
will decline relative to the past. Related to this is the fact that union workers have traditionally 
negotiated pensions more often than their  nonunion counterparts; however most labor experts 
predict continued stasis in the union sector, suggesting that on this count as well pensions will 
decline in importance in the future. 
Government pension policy will also play a role in shaping the environment within which 
firms structure their pension plans.  A host of recent reforms have raised pension costs and 
reduced the flexibility of  compensation arrangements, including provisions limiting integration of 
pension benefits with Social Security payments, ceilings on the amount of  contributions that can be 
accumulated on a tax-deferred basis, and prohibitions against using age in pension computations. 
Firms are now required to continue accruing pension benefits after the normal retirement age for 
older  workers, ruling out cuts in benefit accrual and thus inducing early  retirement (Mitchell, 
forthcoming [a]). Additionally, a  very recent reform outlaws the use of  age as a criterion in early- 
out  window plans, further limiting firms' ability to reward early retirement. These developments 
place  constraints on the range of  policies firms can adopt in the future regarding retirement age 
policy. If  government policy continues to restrict pension practices, this makes providing pensions 
increasingly costly.  Some of  these additional costs may be offset by reducing wages or other 19 
employee benefits, but in other cases finns may be forced to terminate their pension plans which in 
turn will reduce the incentives to retire early  (Mitchell, 1990). 
Some nonfinancial factors are also  likely to affect retirement patterns. For  example, 
changes in productivity among older workers may also affect the decision to leave  the labor force. 
Mitchell, Levine, and Pozzebon (1988) review evidence indicating that differences in retirement 
behavior across industries and occupations are correlated with differences in age/productivity 
profiles. Specifically, workers in blue collar occupations have been shown to retire  relatively 
earlier and to face greater productivity declines with age.  However, at a macroeconomic level, the 
movement away from manufacturing towards the service sector will lead to a smaller share of  blue 
collar jobs in the economy.  Hence, diminished productivity should be less of  a problem for older 
workers and they may  be expected to remain in the workforce longer as we move into the 21st 
century. 
The changing health status of  older workers may have an impact on future retirement 
behavior though there is controversy about the direction this will take.  Most workers do not retire 
for  health-related reasons, and it may be that the small percentage that does should decline as a 
result of improving health status in the future.  On the other hand increasing longevity does not 
necessarily translate into better health among older workers; people may simply live  longer in a 
poor state of health (Chapman, LaPlante, and Wilenski 1986;  Ycas 1987). Hence offsetting health 
patterns may not significantly affect future retirement behavior. 
In summary: our review of  the future paths of  the economic determinants of  retirement 
suggests that the trend towards early  retirement will slow and perhaps even reverse as the baby 
boom moves beyond middle age. This conclusion rests on anticipated patterns of  financial 
incentives which have already been legislated (e.g. Social Security) and on others which we have 
good reason to expect to change (e.g. pensions).  In addition, sectoral shifts in the economy away 
from blue collar work will also lead to reduced early retirement since productivity losses associated 
with older blue collar workers will be less important as this sector contracts. 20 
Other  Labor Market Imolications  of an  Aging Workiorce 
Certainly  the most direct impact of  an aging baby boom will be on retirement  behavior. 
Nevertheless, the demographic change will certainly  have other labor  market  consequences as well. 
Here we focus on two additional outcomes:  unemployment, and wages for both older and younger 
workers. 
While unemployment  has been, and will remain, quite volatile  over the business cycle, 
recent evidence indicates that  the 'natural rate" or what  other economists have termed the "full 
employment-unemployment  rate" has varied tremendously over time.  For instance, the 
unemployment rate of 4.1% in 1956 was the lowest rate  in  the years immediately  preceding and 
following it, indicating  the top of  the business cycle.  The  unemployment  rate in two other peak 
years, 1979 and 1989, were considerably  higher  at 5.8% and 5.0%, respectively. 
While different  arguments have been  advanced to explain changes in the natural 
unemployment rate over time, one important component of  the explanation relies  on the changing 
age structure of  the workforce  since the baby boom has come of  age. In 1956, baby boomers were 
not yet in the labor  force and had no effect on labor  force statistics.  However  by 1979, baby 
boomers had (for  the most part) entered the labor  market in full force, twisting the age distribution 
of the workforce  towards younger workers.  Younger  workers  generally  have higher 
unemployment rates  even during  periods of  full  employment, because they experience relatively 
more frictional  unemployment.  As a result, the aggregate unemployment  rate rose, since it is 
simply the weighted average of  each age group's unemployment  rate.  The weight on younger, 
higher  unemployment workers  was therefore higher  throughout  the 1970's as a result of  the 
numerousness of the baby boom  cohort. 
This aspect of rising unemployment  patterns over time has been analyzed to some extent in 
the economics literature  (Antos,  et.  al. 1979).  For instance, as much as a third of  the increase in 
national unemployment rates between 1957 and 1977 has been attributed  to demographic  change 
(Flaim  1979).  This change is so massive that some analysts suggest that national unemployment 21 
rates  should be computed with a fixed age-distribution of weights  which will reduce the bias in 
time series observations of  a changing age  composition of the labor force (Cain 1979). 
The good news is that the nations  unemployment rates should begin to fall, in mirror 
image to what happened during the 1970's, as  the baby boom ages.  When baby boomers move 
into the older age group, the heavy weight on a demographic group which experiences relatively 
little unemployment will again reduce the aggregate unemployment rate. (Taking Cain's 
perspective, of  course, the national unemployment rate will now be "too low", in contrast to the 
late 1970's.) 
As a group, older workers experience less unemployment then their younger counterparts. 
However those who do lose their job often experience a long spell of  unemployment, and older 
workers may find this more costly than do younger ones because they experience a greater gap 
between earnings on the old and new job (Podgursky and Swaim 1987, Shapiro and Sandell 1987, 
Howland and Peterson 1988). Average unemployment duration may also be longer for  the older 
individual than for  younger workers. These findings have been interpreted as supportive of  the 
view that firms are reluctant to hire older workers since they will have fewer years remaining on 
the job over which a firm can recoup investments in firm-specific training (Hutchens 1986, 1988). 
We suggest that  this pattern may change in the next thirty years as the baby boom ages. 
When boomers flooded the labor  market during the 1970s and early 1980's, firms  could readily 
hire younger workers and therefore spread training costs costs  over many years. Wages offered to 
older workers during this time were quite low, if they could find work at all.  In contrast, when the 
baby boom ages, companies may not be able to find enough younger workers.  Though costs  of 
hiring an older worker are still high, a shortage of young workers could increase the relative 
attractiveness of  hiring an older  worker.  Therefore, looking toward 2020, we  predict that 
displaced older workers will still incur substantial losses upon unemployment,  but on the positive 
side, losses observed during the 1970's and early 1980's may  be greatly diminished. 
We  focus last on the likely effects of labor force aging  on wages. One might suspect that 
baby boomers' relative wages will always be somewhat depressed because of crowding.  In 22 
economic terms, a simple labor market model might predict that as the quantity of  workers in a 
given age group increases, the wage they are paid will fall (this relies on the own price  elasticity of 
demand being negative).  However, this simple analysis ignores the possibilities of  substitutes and 
complements across different labor market groups, and between labor and capital.  More complete 
models which incorporate substitutes and complements have, to date, produced mixed evidence. 
For example, research on young baby boomers entering the labor market during the 1970's 
suggests support for  the view that the large  demographic bulge of  workers forced down  boomers 
wages (Freeman 1979, Welch 1979, Russell 1982). However the reverse pattern does not seem to 
hold, at least in the one study which has addressed this question to date.  Specifically, Levine and 
Mitchell (1988) found no evidence that wages of older workers would be substantially altered 
relative to younger workers as the baby boom ages, after estimating own- and cross-price demand 
elasticities for  eight different demographic groups. It seems fair to say that no massive changes in 
wages can be attributed to demographic aging, on the basis of  currently available evidence. 
Discussion  and  Conclusion 
This paper  examines the likely effects of the aging of the baby boom on labor force 
attachment, unemployment, and wages.  Labor market trends between now and 2020 are the focus 
of  analysis, when the majority of  the baby boom generation will confront its retirement decision. 
We have demonstrated  several inherent flaws in projection methods which make minor 
modifications to linear extrapolations. When behavioral patterns change, projections using the 
existing methodology are "too slow" to respond.  Therefore we  outline the key elements of  a more 
comprehensive economic model to project the consequences of  the demographic shock facing the 
labor market. On the basis of  this analysis, we suggest the following conclusions: 
1. The trend towards earlier retirement will slow and perhaps reverse in the next few 
decades. 2. Unemployment should fall among older workers and the aggregate full-employment 
unemployment rate should also decline as the baby boom ages. 
3. The aging of  the baby boom will not  depress wages substantially, either for older 
workers or for  other demographic groups. 
23 24 
R  efe re rt  ces 
Aaron, H.J. (1982) Economic Effects of  Social Security. Washington, D.C.:  Brookings. 
Aaron, H.J., B.P. Bosworth, and 0. Burtless (1989), Can America Afford to Grow Old?: Paying 
for Social Security. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 
Andrews, F. and O.S. Mitchell. (1986)  The Current and Future Role of  Pensions in Old-Age 
Economic Security.  Benefits Ouarterlv 2. PP. 25-36. 
Antos, J., W. Mellow, and J. E. Triplett. (1979) "What is a Current Equivalent to Unemployment 
Rates of the Past?"  Monthly Labor Review. March. pp. 36-46. 
Bailey, M.N. (1987) "Aging and the Ability to Work". In Work. Health, and Income Among the 
Elderly. Ed. 0. Burtless. Washington, D.C.: Brookings. 
Burkhauser, R. and J. Quinn. (1989) "American Patterns of  Work and Retirement". In Rcdefinina 
the  Process of  Retirement: An Jnternational Perspective. Ed. W. Schmahl. New York: 
Springer Verlag. pp. 91-113. 
Burkhauser, R. and J. Quinn.  (1983) "Is Mandatory Retirement Overrated?" Journal of  Human 
Resources  18. pp. 337-358. 
Burtless, G. and A.H. Munnell (1991), "Does a  Trend Toward Early Retirement Create Problems 
for the Economy?" In Retirement and Public Policy. Ed. A. H. Munnell. Washington, DC: 
National Academy of  Social Insurance. 
Burtless, G. and R. Moffitt. (1984) "The Effect of Social Security Benefits on the Labor Supply of 
the Aged". In Retirement and Economic Behavior. Eds. H. Aaron and G. Burtless. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings.  pp.135-171. 
Cain, G. C. (1979)  "The Unemployment Rate as an Economic Indicator."  Monthly Labor 
Review.  March.  pp. 24-35. 
Chapman, S. H., M.P. LaPlante, and G. Wilensky. (1986)  "Life Expectancy and Health Status of 
the Aged."  Social Security Bulletin.  October. pp. 24-48. 
Clark, R.L. and A. McDermed. (1990) The Choice of Pension Plan in a Chanein  Regulatory 
Environment. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press. 25 
Field[s, CS. and OS.  Mitchell (1984)  Retirement.  Pensions, and Social  Security.  Cambridge, 
Mass.:  MIT Press. 
Flaim, P.O. (1979)  "The Effect of Demographic Changes on the Nations Unemployment Rate. 
Monthly Labor Review. March. pp. 13-23. 
Flaim, P.O. and H. N. Fullerton, Jr. (1978) "Labor Force Projections to 1990: Three Possible 
Paths.  Monthly Labor Review  December. pp.  25-35. 
Freeman, R.B. (1979), "The Effect of Demographic Factors on Age-Earnings Profiles." Journal of 
Human Resources  14. pp. 289-3 18. 
Fullerton, H.N., Jr. (1988), "An Evaluation of  Labor Force Projections to 1985." Monthly Labor 
Review.  111. pp. 7-17. 
_______ (1982), "How Accurate Were Projections of  the 1980 Labor Force?" Monthly Labor 
Review 105. pp. :15-21. 
_______ (1985), "The 1995 Labor Force: BLS' Latest Projections." Monthly Labor Review  108. 
pp. 17-25. 
_______ (1987),  "Labor Force Projections,  1986 to 2000.' Monthly Labor Review 110. pp. 19- 
29. 
_______ (1989), "New Labor Force Projections, Spanning 1988 to 2000." Monthly Labor 
Review  112. pp. :3-12. 
Fullerton, H.N., Jr. and J. Tschetter (1983),  "The 1995 Labor Force: A Second Look." Monthly 
Labor Review  106.  pp. 3.10. 
Goldin, C. (1990) Understanding the Gender Gap. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gustman, A. and T. Steinmeier. (1991) "Changing the Social Security Rules for Work After  65'. 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 44. pp. 
Gustman, A. and T. Steinmeier. (1984) "Partial Retirement and the Analysis of  Retirement 
Behavior". Industrial and Labor Relations Review 37 (April). pp. 403-415. 
1-lowland, M. and G.E. Peterson. (1988) "Labor Market Conditions and the Reemployment of 
Displaced Workers."  Industrial and Labor Relations Review. October. pp. 109-122. 26 
Hutchens, R.M. (1986)  Delayed Payment Contracts and a Firns Propensity to Hire Older 
Workers.  Journal of Labor Economics.  October. pp. 439-457. 
Hutchens, R.M. (1988) "Do Job  Opportunities Decline with Age?  Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review.  October. pp. 89-99. 
Ippolito, R. (1986)  Pensions. Economics. and Public Policy, Homewood, IL: Dow-Jones Irwin, 
Pension Research Council. 
Ippolito, R. (1990)  'Toward Explaining Earlier Retirement after 1970". Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review. 43 July. pp. 556-569. 
Kutscher, R.E. (1987), "Overview and Implications of the Projections to 2000." Monthly Labor 
Review  110. pp. 3-9. 
_______  (1989), "Projections Summary and Emerging Issues." Monthly Labor Review 112. pp 
66-74. 
Lazear, E.P. (1988)  "Adjusting to an Aging Labor Force.'  NBER Working Paper No. 2802, 
December. 
Leonesio, M. (1990) "The Effects of the Social Security Earnings Test on the Labor  Market 
Activity of Older Americans: A Review of  the Evidence" Social Security Bulletin 53 May. 
pp. 2-21. 
Levine, PB. and O.S. Mitchell. (1988) "The Baby Boom's Legacy: Relative Wages in the 
Twenty-first Century", American Economic Review May. pp. 63-66. 
L.evy, F. (1987) Dollars and Dreams: The Changing American Income Distribution. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 
Lumsdaine, R., J.H. Stock, and D. Wise. (1990) "Efficient Windows and Labor Force 
Reduction". NBER Working Paper 3369. May. 
Luzadis, R. and OS. Mitchell. (forthcomingY'Explaining Pension Dynamics", Journal of  Human 
Resources. 
McMillan, H.M. and J. B. Baesel. (1990) "The Macroeconomic Impact of  the Baby Boom 
Generation."  Journal of  Macroeconomics.  Spring. pp. 167-195. 27 
Mitchell, OS. (1991) "The Effect of  Mandatory Benefits Packages.  In Research in Labor 
Economics. Eds. L. Bassi, D. Crawford, R. Ehrenberg. Greenwich,  Ct: JAI Press,  1991. 
pp. 297-320. 
Mitchell, OS. (1991) "Pensions Reflect Employer and Employee Preferences.' In Retirement and 
Public Policy. Ed. A. Munneli. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of  Social Insurance, 
1991. 
Mitchell, OS. (forthcoming [a])"Social Security Reforms and Poverty in Dual-Earner Couples". 
Journal of  Population Economics. 
Mitchell, OS. (forthcoming tb]) 'Trends in Pension Formulas". In  Trends in Pensions 1991. Eds. 
J. Turner and D. Belier. 
Mitchell, OS. and G.S. Fields (1985) "Rewards for Continued Work". In Horizontal Equity. 
Uncertainty, and the Economics of Wellbeing. Eds. M. David and T. Smeeding.  Chicago: 
University of  Chicago Press. 
Mitchell, 0. S., P. B. Levine and S. Pozzebon. (1988) "Retirement Differences by lndusuy and 
Occupation."  Journal of  Gerontology. August.  pp. 545-551. 
Mitchell, O.S. and R. Luzadis. (1988) "Changes in Pension Incentives Through Time." Industrial 
and Labor Relations Rcview  42 (October). pp.  100-108. 
Mitchell, OS. with P. Levine and S. Pozzebon. (1988) "Retirement Differences by Occupation 
and Industry."  The Gerontologist 28  (August). pp.  545-51. 
Moffitt, R.  (1987) "Life-Cycle Labor Supply and Social Security: A Time  Series Analysis". In 
Work. Health and Income Among the Elderly. Ed. 0. Burtless. Washington, D.C.:' 
Brookings. 
Mutschler, P. (1986) "How Golden a Handshake?" Compensation and Benefits Management 
Review 2 (Summer). pp. 277-283. 
Piascentini, J. and T. Cerino. (1990)  EBRT Databook on Employee Benefits. Washington, D.C: 
Employee Benefit Research Institute. 28 
Podgursky, M.and P.Swaim. (1987) 'Job  Displacement and Earnings Loss:  Evidence from the 
Displaced Worker Survey."  Industrial and Labor Relations Review.  October. pp. 17-29. 
Poterba, J. and L. Summers (1987).  Public Policy Implications of Declining Old-Age Mortality". 
In Work. Health. and income Among the Elderly. Ed. G. Burtless. Washington. D.C.: 
Brookings. 
Quinn, J., R. Burkhauser, and D. Myers. (1990) Passing the Torch: The Influence of Economic 
Incentives on Work and Retirement. Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn. 
Ransom, R. and R. Sutch (1986) "The Labor of  Older Americans: Retirement of Men on and off 
the Job". Journal of  Economic History 46 (March). pp. 1-30. 
Rejda, G. (1982) Economic and Social Security. New York: Wiley and Sons. 
Russell, L. B.(1982)  The Baby  Boom Generation and the Economy. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Studies in Social Economics. 
Samrnartino, F. (1987). "The Effect of  Health on Retirement'. Social Security Bulletin 50 
(February). pp. 31-47. 
Shapiro, D. and S.H.  SandeIl. (1987) "The Reduced Pay of  Older Job Losers:  Age Discrimination 
and Other Explanations."  In The Problem isn't Age: Work and Older Americans. Ed. S. 
H. Sandell. New York:  Praeger. 
Turner, J. and D. BelIer, Eds. (1990) Trends in Pensions 1990. Pension and Welfare Benefit 
Agency, US Department of  Labor, Government Printing Office. 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. (1985)  BEA Recional 
Projections. 
U.S. Department of  Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration. (1983) 
"Economic Projections for OASDI Cost Estimates, 1983:  Actuarial Study No. 90.' 
U.S. Department of  Labor, Bureau of  Labor Statistics. (1991) Employment and Earnin as. 
January. 
Welch, F. (1979)  "Effects of  Cohort Size on Earnings: The Baby Boom's 'Financial Bust." 
Journal of  Political Economy.  October. pp. S65-97. 29 
Ycas, MA. (1988)  "Recent Trends in Health Near the Age of  Retirement: New Findings from the 
Health Interview Survey.  Social Security Bulletin. December.  pp. 5-16. Table 1. 
Labor  Force Participation of Men Age 60 and over, 
1870-1990 
Year  Percentage 
1870  64.2 
1880  64.3 
1900  66.1 
1930  64.5 
1937  61.5 
1940  54.7 
1950  54.5 
1960  45.4 
1970  40.4 
1980  32.2 
1990  27.6 
Source: 
1870-1980: Ransom and Sutch (1988); note 1940 data not  strictly comparable. 
1990:  USDOL (1991). Table 2a. 
Current and Projected Labor Force Participation Rates 
by Sex and Age 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Observed  BLS  SSA  BEA  SSA 
1990  2000  2000  2015  2020 
All Men  76.1  75.9  77.5  72.0  72.0 
Age group: 
16-24  71.5  74.8 
16-19  55.7  59.0  66.9  63.9  67.7 
20-24  84.3  86.5  86.9  84.0  87.4 
25-54  93.4  92.4 
25-34  94.2  94.1  92.5 
25-29  93.8  95.0  95.3 
30-34  94.6  95.2  95.4 
35-44  94.4  94.3  94.9 
35-39  94.9  95.1  95.4 
40-44  93.9  94.1  94.4 
45-54  90.7  90.5  90.2 
45-49  92.3  92.0  92.0 
50-54  88.8  87.7  86.4 
55-64  67.7  68.1  62.9 
55-59  79.8  79.5  75.3 
60-64  55.5  62.1  57.3 
65+  16.4  14.7  13.0 
65-69  26.0  27.0  26.3 
70+  10.8  10.6  10.7 Table 2b. 
Current and Projected Labor Force Participation Rates 
by Sex and Age (continued) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Observed  BLS  SSA  BEA  SSA 
1990  2000  2000  2015  2020 
All Women  57.5  62.6  59.0  57.5  54.6 
Age group: 
16-24  63.1 
16-19  51.8  59.6  62.4  59.1  63.4 
20-24  71.6  77.9  76.9  84.5  6.7 
25-54  74.1  79.9 
25-34  73.6  82.4  84.3 
25-29  73.8  75.1  75.8 
30-34  73.4  74.4  75.4 
35-44  76.5  84.9  85.6 
35-39  75.5  76.3  77.0 
40-44  77.6  78.0  78.4 
45-54  71.2  76.5  70.7 
45-49  74.8  76.4  76.3 
50-54  66.9  71.6  71.7 
55-64  45.3  49.0  43.0 
55-59  55.3  56.5  55.0 
60-64  35.5  38.8  36.7 
65+  8.7  7.6  7.3 
65-69  17.0  17.6  18.0 
70+  4.8  5.4  5.5 
Source: 
Column  1:  USDOL (1991). 
Column 2:  Fullerton (1989). 
Column 3 and 5:  Social Security Administration (1983). 
Column 4:  Bureau of Economic Analysis (1985). Table 3. 
Comparison of  Actual and  Short Term" 
Labor Forte Participation Rate Projections by Sex and Age 
1980  1980  1985  1985  1990  1990 
Actual  Projected*  Actual  Projccted*  Actual  Proiected* 
All Men  76.8  80.3  76.3  80.4  76.1  76.4 
Age group: 
16-19  61.2  56.7  56.8  54.3  55.7  64.8 
20-24  85.7  87.2  85.0  82.3  84.3  85.0 
25-54  93.4  93.1 
25-34  94.2  96.2  94.7  97.4 
35-44  94.6  96.7  95.0  97.4 
45-54  90.3  95.0  91.0  95.3 
55-64  71.4  83.7  67.7  65.0 
55-59  79.6  88.2 
60-64  55.6  73.9 
65+  18.3  21.8  16.4  15.0 
65-69  24.4  35.9 
70+  10.5  13.2 
All Women  50.9  41.9  54.5  43.7  57.5  57.1 
Age group: 
16-19  53.0  46.6  41.2  52.1  51.8  62.8 
20-24  69.0  52.6  71.8  57.9  71.6  80.4 
25-54  74.1  72.4 
25-34  65.3  40.3  70.9  46.7 
35-44  65.2  50.0  71.8  53.6 
45-54  59.6  59.5  64.4  55.6 
55-64  41.1  47.3  45.3  39.8 
55-59  50.3  52.3 
60-64  33.4  38.7 
65+  7.6  9.9  8.7  6.2 
65-69  13.5  16.3 
70+  4.3  5.1 
Notes: 
*All projections assume moderate economic growth.  Projections for 1980 were made in 1965, 
1985 projections in 1970 and 1990 projections in 1978. 
Columns 1 and 2:  Fullerton (1982). 
Columns 3 and 4:  Fullerton (1988). 
Column 5:  Flaim and Fullerton (1978). 
Column 6:  USDOL (1991). Table 4. 
A Compaison  of  Projection Errors Using Linear Extrapolations 
and BLS Results, Selected Demographic Groups and Years 
1980  1985  1990  2000 
Labor  Forte Participation Rates of: 
Women  Age 20.24 
Observed  69.0  71.8  71.6 
BLS  Projection  52.6  57.9  80.4  77.9 
LinearExtrapolation  52.1  65.2  81.6  88.5 
Men Age 55.64 
Observed  71.4  67.9  67.7 
BLS Projection  83.7  81.3  65.0  68.1 
Linear Extrapolation  83.6  77.9  62.7  53.5 
Women  Age  55.64 
Observed  41.1  42.0  45.3 
BLS  Projection  47.3  45.5  39.8  49.0 
UnearExtrapolation  56.6  56.6  43.8  41.1 F
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